The abstract nature of Dung's seminal theory of argumentation accounts for its widespread application as a general framework for various species of non-monotonic reasoning, and, more generally, reasoning in the presence of conflict. A Dung argumentation framework is instantiated by arguments and a binary conflict based attack relation, defined by some underlying logical theory. The justified arguments under different extensional semantics are then evaluated, and the claims of these arguments define the inferences of the underlying theory. To determine a unique set of justified arguments often requires a preference relation on arguments to determine the success of attacks between arguments. However, preference information is often itself defeasible, conflicting and so subject to argumentation. Hence, in this paper we extend Dung's theory to accommodate arguments that claim preferences between other arguments, thus incorporating metalevel argumentation based reasoning about preferences in the object level. We then define and study application of the full range of Dung's extensional semantics to the extended framework, and study special classes of the extended framework. The extended theory preserves the abstract nature of Dung's approach, thus aiming at a general framework for non-monotonic formalisms that accommodate defeasible reasoning about as well as with preference information. We illustrate by formalising argument based logic programming with defeasible priorities in the extended theory.
Introduction

Background
The formal study of argumentation has come to be increasingly central as a core study within Artificial Intelligence [12] . Logic based models of argumentation are being applied to formalisation of defeasible reasoning and conflict resolution over beliefs and goals, and to decision making over actions [1, 8, 24, 25, 35] . The inherently dialectical nature of these models have provided foundations for formalisation of argumentation-based dialogues [5] , where, for example, one agent seeks to persuade another to adopt a belief it does not already hold to be true [33] , or when agents deliberate about what actions to execute [21] , or negotiate over resources [4] . Furthermore, recent major research projects [6, 7] are developing general models of argumentation based inference, decision making and dialogue, and implementations of these models for deployment in agent and semantic grid applications.
Many of the above theoretical and practical developments build on Dung's seminal theory of argumentation [19] . A Dung argumentation framework is a directed graph consisting of a set of arguments Args and a binary conflict based attack relation R on Args. The extensions, and so justified arguments of a framework are then defined under different semantics, where the choice of semantics equates with varying degrees of scepticism or credulousness. Extensions are defined through application of an 'acceptability calculus', whereby an argument X ∈ Args is said to be acceptable with respect to S ⊆ Args iff any argument Y that attacks X is itself attacked by some argument Z in S (intuitively, any such Z is said to reinstate X ). For example, if S is a maximal (under set inclusion) set such that all its contained arguments are acceptable with respect to S, then S is said to be an extension under the preferred semantics.
Recent years have witnessed intensive formal study, development and application of Dungs ideas in various directions. This can be attributed to the abstract nature of a Dung argumentation framework, and the encoding of intuitive, generic principles of commonsense reasoning through application of the acceptability calculus. The underlying logic, and definition of the logic's constructed arguments Args and attack relation R is left unspecified, thus enabling instantiation of a framework by various logical formalisms. A theory's inferences can then be defined in terms of the claims of the justified arguments constructed from the theory (an argument essentially being a proof of a candidate inference -the argument's claim -in the underlying logic). Dung's theory can therefore be understood as a semantics for non-monotonic reasoning. In this view, what appropriately accounts for the correctness of an inference is that it can be shown to rationally prevail in the face of opposing inferences, where it is application of the acceptability calculus that encodes logic neutral, rational means for establishing such standards of correctness. Indeed, many logic programming formalisms and non-monotonic logics (e.g. default, auto-epistemic, defeasible, non-monotonic modal logics and certain instances of circumscription) have been shown to conform to Dung's semantics [13, [18] [19] [20] ].
Dung's extensional semantics may yield multiple extensions. The sceptically justified arguments are those that appear in every extension. However, one may then be faced with the problem of how to choose between conflicting credulously justified arguments that belong to at least one, but not all extensions. To illustrate, consider two individuals P and Q exchanging arguments A, B . . . about the weather forecast: P 1 : "Today will be dry in London since the BBC forecast sunshine" = A. Q 1 : "Today will be wet in London since CNN forecast rain" = B.
A and B claim contradictory conclusions and so attack each other (symmetrically attack). Under Dung's preferred semantics, there are two extensions: {A} and {B}. Neither argument is sceptically justified. One solution is to provide some means for preferring one argument to another. Some works (e.g., [32, 34] ) formalise the role of preferences in the underlying logical formalisms that instantiate a Dung framework. For example, in [32] , if X undercuts Y (where 'undercut' denotes a certain type of conflict based interaction), then XRY if Y is not stronger than (preferred to) X . Other approaches formalise the role of preferences at an abstract level. In Amgoud and Cayrol's Preference based Argumentation Frameworks [3] , a Dung framework is augmented with a preference ordering on Args, so that an attack by X on Y is successful only if Y is not preferred to X . In Bench-Capon's Value based Argumentation Frameworks (VAFs) [11] , a Dung framework is augmented with values and value orderings, so that an attack by X on Y is successful only if the value promoted by Y is not ranked higher than the value promoted by X according to a given ordering on values.
Examining the role of preferences in the above weather example, one might reason that A is preferred to B because the BBC are deemed more trustworthy than CNN. Hence B does not successfully attack A, and so this attack can be removed and we are only left with the successful attack from A to B. Thus only {A} will be a preferred extension; A is sceptically justified. This example illustrates resolution of an argumentation framework obtained by replacing symmetric attacks with asymmetric attacks. Properties relating frameworks and their resolutions have been studied in [9] and [26] . Properties of frameworks obtained through removal of asymmetric attacks have also been studied in the context of VAFs.
Overview of paper
Information required to determine the success of an attack is often assumed pre-specified, as a given preference or value ordering. However, preference information may be contradictory, given that preferences may vary according to context, and distinct sources may valuate the strengths of arguments using different criteria, or indeed assign different valuations for any given criterion. Thus, one often needs to reason, and indeed argue about, as well as with, defeasible and possibly conflicting preference information. To illustrate, consider continuation of the above dialogue about the weather:
In this paper we are thus motivated to extend Dung's theory to accommodate argumentation about preferences. The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we review Dung's theory of argumentation. In the sections that follow we describe our contributions to the formal study and application of argumentation:
• In Sections 3 and 4, Dung's theory of argumentation is extended to integrate 'metalevel' argumentation about preferences between arguments. The extended theory preserves the abstract nature of Dung's approach. Arguments expressing preferences (preference arguments) are simply nodes in a graph, and application of preferences is abstractly characterised; by defining a new attack relation that originates from a preference argument, and that attacks an attack between the arguments that are the subject of the preference claim. Thus, no commitment is made to how preferences are defined and applied in the formalism instantiating the framework. Preference arguments expressing contradictory preferences attack each other, where these attacks can then themselves be attacked by preference arguments. We then extend Dung's acceptability calculus so that both arguments and attacks need to be reinstated. The extensional semantics for the extended framework are then defined in exactly the same way as for a Dung framework, and some basic results that hold of the extensional semantics for a Dung framework are also shown to hold for the extended framework. Our aim is to therefore lay foundations for straightforward modification of applications and developments of Dung's work to accommodate argumentation about preferences.
• The extended theory provides a general setting for formally studying the application of preferences in argumentation, and, more generally, the removal of attacks. Thus, the above mentioned work on resolutions of frameworks [9, 26] can now be extended to account for the use of preference arguments in obtaining such resolutions. In this paper we study two special classes of extended argumentation framework: Section 5 studies hierarchical frameworks that posit restrictions on interactions between arguments at the object and metalevel, and Section 6 studies preference symmetric frameworks that only allow for removal of attacks between symmetrically attacking arguments.
• The extended theory is proposed as a unifying framework in which to formalise and extend works that augment Dung's framework with preferences [3, 11] . In support of this proposal, Section 5 describes how value based argumentation [11] can be formalised and extended in hierarchical frameworks in order to integrate metalevel reasoning about values and value orderings.
• The extended theory is proposed as a semantics for object level non-monotonic formalisms that accommodate defeasible reasoning about priorities. Such formalisms extend the object level logical languages for argument construction with rules for deriving priorities amongst rules, e.g., in default logic [14] and logic programming [24, 34] . One can then construct 'priority arguments' whose claims determine preferences between other mutually attacking arguments. Arguments claiming conflicting priorities may be constructed and preferences between these can be established on the basis of other priority arguments. Our approach generalises these formalisms in that preferences may be based not only on rule priorities, but on any criterion for valuating argument strength, including criteria that relate to the argument as a whole (such as the value promoted by an argument). Furthermore, these formalisms do not straightforwardly allow for application of Dung's acceptability calculus, and evaluation of the justified arguments under the full range of Dung's semantics. The extended framework provides for such evaluation, through provision of an abstract characterisation of preference application while retaining the basic conceptual machinery of Dung. In Section 7 we show how the extended theory can serve as a semantics for Prakken and Sartor's argument based logic programming with defeasible priorities (ALP-DP) [34] . 1 Arguments defined by an ALP-DP theory instantiate a preference symmetric framework, so that in contrast with [34] , one can then evaluate the justified arguments of an ALP-DP theory under all of Dung's semantics. In Section 8 we discuss related work; in particular the work of Kakas and Moraitis [23, 24] , and conclude and indicate directions for future work in Section 9. Finally, the reader is referred to the appendix for proofs of the paper's propositions.
Dung's theory of argumentation
In this section we review Dung's theory of argumentation [19] . Dung then defines the acceptability of arguments, and the characteristic function and admissible extensions of a framework. 4. If S is conflict free, then S is an admissible extension of AF iff each argument in S is acceptable with respect to S (i.e.,
S ⊆ F AF (S)).
Intuitively, an argument A is acceptable with respect to S if for any argument B that attacks A, there is a C in S that attacks B, in which case C is said to defend or 'reinstate' A. An admissible extension S can then be interpreted as a coherent defendable position. From hereon, since we will refer to an arbitrary but fixed argumentation framework, we will write F instead of F AF .
Admissibility is augmented by preferred, complete, stable and grounded semantics:
, S a conflict free subset of Args, and F the characteristic function of AF. Then:
• S is a preferred extension iff S is a set inclusion maximal admissible extension.
• S is a complete extension iff each argument which is acceptable w.r.t. S is in S (S = F (S)).
• S is a stable extension iff ∀B / ∈ S, ∃A ∈ S such that ( A, B) ∈ R.
• S is the grounded extension iff S is the least fixed point of F (the smallest complete extension).
For s ∈ {complete, preferred, stable, grounded}, an argument is said to be sceptically justified under the s semantics if it belongs to all extensions. An argument is said to be only credulously justified under the s semantics if it belongs to at least one, but not all, extensions. Sceptical and credulous justification coincide for the grounded semantics given that a framework only ever has a single grounded extension.
The admissible extensions of the framework in Fig. 1 are: ∅, {A}, {B}, {A, D}, and {B, D}. {A, D}, and {B, D} are the preferred and stable extensions. ∅, {A, D}, and {B, D} are the complete extensions, and ∅ the grounded extension. Note that D is sceptically justified under the preferred semantics, but is not sceptically justified under the grounded semantics.
Extended argumentation frameworks
In this section we motivate extending Dung's framework to include arguments that express preferences between other arguments, and so determine whether attacks succeed. Following convention, we may in what follows synonymously write 'defeats' instead of 'successfully attacks'.
Recall the weather forecast example in Section 1 in which arguments A and B symmetrically attack (( A, B), (B, A) ∈ R). Hence {A} and {B} are admissible. We have that A is preferred to B (claimed by argument C ). Hence B does not successfully attack (defeat) A, but A does defeat B. If we were to evaluate admissibility on the basis of defeats, then {A} is admissible, and {B} is not an admissible extension.
The impact of argument C could conceivably be modelled by letting C attack B ( 1 in Fig. 2 ). This would yield the required result: only {A} is admissible. However, suppose an argument D that defeats A (e.g. D = "the BBC forecast is for Glasgow and not London"). Then {B} would still not be admissible ( 2 in Fig. 2 ), which is clearly inappropriate. C expresses a preference for A over B, but if A is defeated by another argument, then B should be reinstated.
Intuitively, C is an argument about the relationship between A and B. Specifically, in expressing a preference for A over B, C is an argument for A's defence against B's attack on A. That is, C defence attacks B's attack on A ( 3 in Fig. 2 ) so that B's attack on A does not succeed as a defeat. B's attack on A is, as it were, cancelled out, and we are left with A defeating B. Now, if D defeats A, D reinstates B and {B, D} is an admissible extension of 4 in Fig. 2 .
Of course, given C claiming a preference for B over A and so defence (d) attacking A's attack on B, then the issue of which attack succeeds as a defeat is once again unresolved. Intuitively, C and C claim contradictory preferences and so attack each other ( 5 in Fig. 2 ). These attacks can themselves be subject to d attacks in order to determine the defeat relation between C and C and so A and B. In 6 in Fig. 2 , E d attacks the attack from C to C , and so determines that C defeats C . Hence, C 's d-attack on B's attack on A is cancelled out, and we are left with B defeating A; the discussion concludes in favour of Q's argument that it will be a wet day in London.
We now formally define the elements of an Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF). As suggested by the above example, this involves extending Dung's argumentation framework to include a second attack relation D that ranges from arguments X to attacks (Y , Z ) ∈ R, where R is the standard binary attack relation in a Dung framework. If X attacks (Y , Z ) then X expresses that Z is preferred to Y . If X attacks ( Z , Y ), then X expresses that Y is preferred to Z . Hence, EAFs are required to conform to the constraint that any such arguments expressing contradictory preferences must attack each other (i.e.,
Definition 4. An Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF) is a tuple (Args, R, D) such that
Args is a set of arguments, and:
Notation 1. From hereon we may use the following notation:
•
Example 1. The EAF for the weather forecasting example is (see Fig. 3 ):
In an EAF, preferences are not defined by some externally given preference ordering, but are themselves claimed by arguments. Intuitively, given that an argument A attacks B, then one would reason that A defeats B, only if the arguments S that one is currently committed to, contain no argument claiming that B is preferred to A. That is to say, the success of an attack as a defeat is parameterised w.r.t. the preference arguments available in some such set S of arguments. Definition 5. Let (Args, R, D) be an EAF and S ⊆ Args. Then A defeats S B iff (A, B) ∈ R and ¬∃C ∈ S s.t. (C, (A, B) We state an obvious property of the defeat relation:
Proposition 1. If A defeats S B, then ∀S ⊆ S, A defeats S B.
We now define a conflict free set S of arguments. One might define such a set as one in which no two arguments attack each other. However, if A asymmetrically attacks B ( A B) but an argument C claims that B is preferred to A (C (A B)) then B and A may both be justified. We may therefore want to allow both A and B to appear in an admissible extension of an EAF, which (as in the case of a Dung framework) will be defined as a conflict free set S whose contained arguments are acceptable w.r.t. S. This would clearly be inappropriate if arguments A and B refer to logically incompatible states of affairs as when arguing about what is believed to be the case. However, this may be appropriate in a practical reasoning context. Consider value based argumentation over action [8] in which an argument B justifying a course of action, such as a medical treatment, is asymmetrically attacked by an argument A claiming that the treatment is prohibitively expensive. If the value promoted by B (improving patient health) is ranked higher than that promoted by A (reducing costs), then the attack is removed and both arguments may then be held as justified. One accepts that the action is expensive, while still pursuing the course of action (this example will be formalised in Section 5). Hence, a conflict free set is defined as follows: 
Defining the acceptability of arguments
Consider Example 2 (see Fig. 5a ). Is A acceptable w.r. 
Recall that an admissible Dung extension is a set S whose contained arguments are acceptable w.r.t. S. One can then motivate a suitably 'rational' definition of acceptability by appealing to some basic intuitions that the derived notion of admissibility should satisfy. Specifically, Dung's 'Fundamental Lemma' [19] expresses that if S is admissible, and A is accept- Ac1's definition of acceptability, and the derived notion of admissibility, fails to satisfy the fundamental lemma. Consider  Fig. 5b , in which A1 and A2 (which is not attacked by any argument) are Ac1 acceptable w.r.t. S, and so S is Ac1 admissible.
However, B3 (which is not attacked by any argument) is acceptable w.r.t. S, but S = {A1, A2} ∪ {B3} is not admissible since A1 is now not Ac1 acceptable w.r.t. S . This is because the inclusion of B3 in S means that A2 S B2. Dung frameworks satisfy the fundamental lemma because every attack originating from an argument in an admissible extension is preserved by inclusion of an argument acceptable w.r.t. the extension. This is not the case for EAFs. Inclusion of B3 cancels out the attack from A2 to B2, so that A2 no longer defeats B2. Hence, a definition of acceptability that ensures satisfaction of the fundamental lemma will require that when checking the acceptability of A1 w.r.t. S, one not only needs to check that A1 → S B1 is reinstated, but also that A2 → S B2 is reinstated. The latter is not the case since no argument in S defeats S B3.
In general, we need to check for the existence of a defeat reinstatement set.
We now formally define the acceptability of an argument: Under this definition of acceptability, S in Fig. 5b is not admissible since A1 is not acceptable w.r.t. S. In Fig. 5c would exist. Note that the acceptability of an argument with respect to a set S does not amount to checking whether S is admissible. In Fig. 5c , suppose an additional argument B4 that attacked and defeated S C 2. A would still be acceptable w.r.t. S, but S would not be admissible.
Defining the extensions of an extended argumentation framework
The admissible, preferred, complete and stable extensions of an EAF are now defined in the same way as for Dung frameworks: Definition 9. Let S be a conflict free subset of Args in (Args, R, D). Then:
• S is an admissible extension iff every argument in S is acceptable w.r.t. S.
• S is a complete extension iff each argument which is acceptable w.r.t. S is in S.
• S is a stable extension iff ∀B / ∈ S, ∃A ∈ S such that A defeats S B.
For s ∈ {preferred, complete, stable}, A is sceptically, respectively credulously, justified under the s semantics iff A is in every, respectively at least one, s extension. Note that {B, C , E} is the single preferred, complete, and stable extension in Example 1.
We now state some basic results that hold of Dung and Extended Argumentation Frameworks. In particular, checking for existence of a reinstatement set when defining acceptability ensures that Dung's fundamental lemma holds for EAFs: In [19] , the grounded extension of a Dung framework AF = (Args, R) is defined as the least fixed point of the framework's characteristic function F (see Definitions 2 and 3). F is shown to be monotonic, i.e., if S ⊆ S then F (S) ⊆ F (S ), where S and S are both subsets of Args. The monotonicity of F guarantees the existence of a least fixed point and gives it a constructive flavour: its least fixed point -the AF's grounded extension (GE(AF)) -can be approached under iterated application of F to the empty set. Defining the sequence:
If AF is finitary, i.e., every argument is attacked by at most a finite number of arguments, then the grounded extension can be obtained by iterative application to the empty set:
We now define the characteristic function of an EAF. For reasons that will become apparent later, the domain of the function is restricted to conflict free sets. ArgsC denote the set of all conflict free subsets of Args. The characteristic function F of is defined as follows:
From hereon, since we will always refer to an arbitrary but fixed EAF, we will simply write F rather than F . As for •
However, an EAFs characteristic function F is not, in general, monotonic. For example, A is acceptable w.r.t. S = {C, C 1, C 2} in Fig. 5c ), but is not acceptable w.r.t. the conflict free {C, C 1, C 2, B1, B2}.
Since in general F is not monotonic, existence of a least fixed point is not guaranteed. However Proposition 6 states that each F i in Definition 11 is conflict free (hence F can be applied iteratively), and that the sequence is monotonically increasing under ⊆.
Proposition 6. Let F be the characteristic function of an EAF, and F
and F i is conflict free.
Hence, rather than define the grounded extension as the least fixed point, the grounded extension of a finitary EAF is defined in terms of the sequence in Definition 11.
Definition 12. (Args, R, D)
is finitary iff ∀A ∈ Args, the set {B | (B, A) ∈ R} is finite, and ∀(A, B) ∈ R, the set {C | (C, (A, B) ) ∈ D} is finite.
Definition 13. Let be a finitary EAF and F
It should be obvious to see that the grounded extension of any EAF (Args, R, D) will contain any argument that is not attacked (i.e. the set {X | ¬∃Y , (Y , X) ∈ R}). The following example illustrates that in general it does not hold that the grounded extension is a subset of the sceptically justified arguments under the preferred semantics (a result that does hold for Dung frameworks). The 'self reinstating argument' B is excluded when adopting a 'constructivist' approach:
A} is the grounded extension. However, adopting a 'declarative' perspective, {C}, {C, A} and {C, B} are admissible, and {C, A} and {C, B} the preferred extensions. Hence, only C is sceptically justified under the preferred semantics. The grounded semantics excludes self-reinstating arguments such as B, and so gives justified status to arguments such as A.
To conclude, we have extended Dung's theory of argumentation to accommodate metalevel arguments that express preferences between arguments. The extended theory preserves the abstract nature of Dung's approach, and based on a novel notion of acceptability that additionally requires reinstatement of defeats, defines the extensional semantics in the same way (apart from the grounded semantics) as for a Dung framework. We have also shown that some of the basic results that hold of the extensional semantics for Dung frameworks, also hold for the extended frameworks. We therefore suggest that applications and developments of Dung's work can be readily modified to accommodate argumentation about preferences. For example, game based proof theories (e.g., [15, 37] ) and dialogue models that build on these games (e.g., [33] ), make core use of the notion of reinstatement encoded in the acceptability calculus. Notice also, that Proposition 4 implies that (as with Dung's theory) when defining games for determining the credulous acceptance of an argument, it will suffice to show that A belongs to an admissible extension rather than having to construct a preferred extension containing A. Finally, note that while in general the characteristic function of an EAF is not monotonic, the following two sections study two special classes of EAF whose characteristic functions are monotonic.
Value based argumentation in hierarchical extended argumentation frameworks
In this section we study a special class of EAF -hierarchical EAFs -and then show how Bench-Capon's value based argumentation [11] can be formalised in hierarchical EAFs, and extended to integrate metalevel reasoning about values and value orderings.
Thus far we have considered EAFs in which no restrictions are placed on the interaction between object level arguments and metalevel arguments expressing preferences over the object level arguments. In hierarchical EAFs, the argumentation is 'stratified' into levels so that, intuitively, each level is a Dung framework in which all binary attacks are restricted to arguments within the framework. These binary attacks are then attacked by defence attacks that exclusively originate from arguments expressing preferences in the immediate metalevel.
Definition 14. = (Args, R, D) is a hierarchical EAF iff there exists a partition H = (((Args
. .) such that:
The characteristic function of a bounded hierarchical EAF satisfies monotonicity:
Proposition 7. Let F be the characteristic function of a bounded hierarchical EAF (Args, R, D). Let S and S be conflict free subsets of Args such that S ⊆ S . Then F (S) ⊆ F (S ).
If F 's domain were not restricted to conflict free sets then F would not be monotonic. Consider the following counterexample that assumes an unrestricted domain:
The monotonicity of F guarantees existence of a least fixed point.
Definition 15. The grounded extension of a bounded hierarchical EAF
, denoted GE( ), is the least fixed point of its characteristic function F .
Hence, as in the case of a Dung framework, the grounded extension can be approached, and under the finitary restriction be obtained, by iterative application to the empty set. Note that Proposition 6 implies that the iteration defined in Definition 11 is indeed possible, i.e., that each F i is conflict free.
If is finitary, then
The extended argumentation theory provides a unifying framework in which to formalise and extend works that augment Dung's framework with preferences [3, 11] . In support of this claim we formalise and extend value based argumentation in hierarchical EAFs. Firstly, we recall [11] 's value based argumentation: Definition 16. Args, R, V , val, P is a value-based argumentation framework (VAF), where val is a function from Args to a non-empty set of values V , and P is a set {a 1 , . . . , a n }, where each a i names a total ordering (audience)
An The extensions and justified arguments of an aVAF Γ = Args, R, V , val, a are those of the Dung framework (Args, R a ). Symmetric attacks in Γ are thus resolved to obtain asymmetric defeats in (Args, R a ), and (as discussed in Section 3) asymmetric attacks may be removed so that if A asymmetrically attacks B, but B's value is ordered (by audience > a ) above A's value, then neither argument defeats a each other, and so both may appear in the same extension. [11] shows ( A) , and assuming no cycles in the same value in Γ , then there is guaranteed to be a unique, non-empty preferred extension of Γ , and a polynomial time algorithm to find it. Thus, for problematic odd cycles such as A B C
A which only yield ∅ as an admissible extension of a Dung framework, then if A, B and C do not promote the same value, any audience derived defeat relation will yield a single preferred extension.
Reasoning about values and value orderings can be accommodated by formalising value based argumentation in a hierarchical EAF in which the first level includes the arguments and attacks in an aVAF. Pairwise orderings on values in V are value preference arguments in the second level, so that if v1, v2 ∈ V then 'v1 > v2' and 'v2 > v1' are value preference arguments that attack each other in the second level (see Fig. 6a 
where v1|v2 is a level 3 argument representing an audience that selects v1 > v2. Now, the unique preferred extension of the EAF in Fig. 6a ) is {A, v1 > v2, v1|v2}. In this way, we can represent the meta-level reasoning required to find the preferred extension of an aVAF.
is defined as follows:
, value preference arguments in Args2 defence attack attacks between arguments in Args1);
e., audience arguments in Args3 defence attack attacks between value preference arguments in Args2);
If in 2, 3 and 4, the ⊆ relation is replaced by =, then Γ and are said to be equivalent. Notice that is defined so that one could additionally consider other arguments and attacks in levels 2 and 3. For example, arguments in level 2 that directly attack value preference arguments, or arguments in level 3 representing different audiences.
Indeed, given a VAF Args, R, V , val, P , then its EAF is obtained as in Definition 18, except that now {a | a ∈ P } ⊆ Args3 (recall that P is the set of all possible audiences). A VAF and its obtained EAF are then said to be equivalent if {a | a ∈ P } = Args3. Notice that if for any a, a ∈ P , (a,
, then it follows from the definition of an EAF (Definition 4) that a and a attack each other, i.e. (a, a ), (a , a) ∈ R3. Since each possible audience argument corresponds to a different total ordering on values, and ∀v, v ∈ V , v > v and v > v are value preference arguments in Args2, then every audience argument will R3 attack every other audience argument. Intuitively, a level 1 argument in the EAF will then be sceptically justified under the preferred semantics iff it is objectively accepted [11] (justified irrespective of the chosen audience) in the corresponding VAF. A level 1 argument will be credulously justified iff it is subjectively accepted [11] (justified for at least one chosen audience). Of course, given representation of multiple audiences, one can in principle incorporate a fourth level to model argumentation over preferences between audiences. 3 Notice, that an audience argument is not necessarily restricted to instantiation by the value ordering that constitutes the audience, but may be instantiated by some justification for the ordering that is the claim of the argument. Furthermore, Definition 18 also allows for arguments that express preferences that are not derived on the basis of value orderings. We now illustrate the above ideas with an example of value based argumentation over action.
Example 6.
In what follows, we assume instantiation of level 1 arguments about actions ( A1, A2, A3 in Fig. 6b )) in a BDI logic, as described in [8] . A1 and A2 are arguments for the medical actions 'give aspirin' and 'give chlopidogrel' respectively. These arguments relate the current beliefs that warrant (are preconditions for) the actions bringing about states of affairs that realise a desired goal and so appeal to a value. Both A1 and A2 appeal to the value of improving the patient's health. They symmetrically attack since they claim alternative actions for the goal of preventing blood clotting.
In [27] we describe construction of level 2 arguments that claim preferences between level 1 arguments based on the relative degree of promotion of a desired value by the level 1 arguments. Thus, B1 is an argument based on clinical trial 1's conclusion that A2's chlopidogrel is more efficacious than A1's aspirin at preventing blood clotting. Hence B1
(A1 A2).
Suppose also B2 based on clinical trial 2's conclusion that the opposite is the case. Hence B1 B2. At this stage neither A1 or A2 are sceptically justified under any semantics. However C 1 claims that trial 1 is preferred to trial 2 since the former uses a more statistically robust design. Now A2 and not A1 is sceptically justified.
However, A3 appealing to the value of cost, states that chlopidogrel is prohibitively expensive and so asymmetrically attacks A2. B3 is the value preference argument ordering improving the patient's health over cost, and B4 the value preference argument ordering cost over improving the patient's health. Now, neither A2 or A1 are sceptically justified (notice that now there is a preferred extension containing B3, A2 and A3). Finally, C 2 is an audience argument that selects B4's value preference over B3. This choice is justified by appealing to the utilitarian principle: since financial resources are low, and chlopidogrel is costly, then use of chlopidogrel will compromise treatment of other patients, and so one should preferentially order cost over improving the patient's health (such a trade off is often made in medical contexts). Hence, A3's attack on A2 succeeds, and so A1 is now sceptically justified; aspirin is now the preferred course of action.
In this section we have integrated metalevel reasoning about values and value orderings in a hierarchical EAF. The question naturally arises as to whether it is always possible, or indeed desirable, to stratify argumentation according to the hierarchical prescription. Pragmatically, it may well be computationally expensive to ensure that for a given knowledge base, the arguments and attacks defined conform to the hierarchical restriction. Philosophically, a bounded hierarchical model assumes a highest level of reasoning in which knowledge is certain and so immune to doubt and conflict. For example, for value based argumentation, a three level hierarchical framework assumes that preferences over value orderings (audiences) are given, and not themselves subject to reasoning. To avoid such an assumption, while avoiding having to ascend levels to infinity, one can appeal to the intuition that our metalevel reasoning is often informed by our object level reasoning; argumentation at lower levels may thus impact on argumentation at higher levels. As Searle puts it [36] , values are often the product of practical reasoning rather than an input to it. Indeed, we refer the reader to an intuitive illustration of non-hierarchical extended argumentation in Example 14 (Section 7).
Preference symmetric extended argumentation frameworks
This section focuses on preference symmetric EAFs in which only attacks between symmetrically attacking arguments can be attacked by arguments expressing preferences. This restriction is satisfied by formalisms in which all attacks between arguments are symmetric (e.g. [16] ), and formalisms in which asymmetric attacks succeed as defeats irrespective of preferences between arguments. An example of the latter is the argument based logic programming formalism in [34] , in which A asymmetrically attacks B iff A claims (proves) what was assumed non-provable (through negation as failure) by a rule in B. This attack succeeds as a defeat irrespective of whether B is preferred to A. The formalism of [34] will be described and formalised as an instance of a preference symmetric EAF in Section 7.
No conflict free set and so admissible extension S of a preference symmetric EAF (ps-EAF) can contain arguments that attack each other. Suppose such a set. Then by Definition 6, if for A, B ∈ S, (B, A) ∈ R, then ∃C ∈ S such that (C, (B, A)) ∈ D, and (A, B) / ∈ R, contradicting is a ps-EAF.
As already noted, value based argumentation does not conform to the restriction imposed by ps-EAFs. Hence, it may be that (B, A) ∈ R and yet B and A both appear in an admissible extension and are both justified. As discussed in Section 3 and illustrated in Example 6, this may be appropriate when applying argumentation to practical reasoning, where an argument for an action may be accepted while acknowledging the validity of a challenge represented by an asymmetrically attacking argument. However, it is not appropriate when the arguments relate to inherently contradictory states of affairs. Consider Pollock's argumentation system [32] in which if B 'Pollock undercuts' A, and A is preferred to B, then B does not defeat A.
The standard example describes A to be an argument claiming that an object is red, given that it looks red and the rule that things that look red are red. This argument is undercut (the application of the rule is invalidated) by an argument B claiming that the object is illuminated by red light. Now, if A is preferred to B, then A and B may both be justified. This is somewhat strange; that one should accept together an argument that makes use of a rule, and an argument that invalidates use of the rule. 4 We suggest that the Pollock undercut be reformulated, either as a symmetric attack, or as an asymmetric attack that succeeds as a defeat irrespective of the relative preference. Note that we do not claim that the only way to ensure that attacking arguments do not appear in the same admissible extension is by requiring that the arguments and attacks instantiate a ps-EAF. It may well be that this property is satisfied given the way in which arguments, attacks and preferences are defined in the underlying logic. For example, preference based argumentation frameworks [3] are instantiated by arguments defined on the basis of a propositional knowledge base. Only asymmetric attacks are defined, and a preference relation on arguments may result in the removal of these attacks. However, in [2] it is shown that if the preference relation applied satisfies some intuitively desirable properties, then no two arguments with contradictory propositions will be jointly justified.
We now present some results that hold for preference symmetric EAFs. Firstly, recall our motivation of the definition of acceptability for EAFs in Section 4.1. We proposed a definition of acceptability (Ac1) that is more formally defined here as 'preference symmetric', or ps, acceptability. 
We saw that when evaluating the acceptability of A1 w.r.t. S in Fig. 5b 
t. S iff every argument in S is acceptable w.r.t. S.
Proposition 10 implies that extensional semantics for ps-EAFs can equivalently be defined on the basis of ps acceptability. Furthermore, the characteristic function of a ps-EAF is monotonic. We can therefore define the grounded extension of a ps-EAF in terms of its characteristic function's least fixed point, and under the finitary restriction obtain the grounded extension by iterative application to the empty set.
Proposition 11. Let F be the characteristic function of a preference symmetric EAF (Args, R, D). Let S and S be conflict free subsets of Args such that S ⊆ S . Then F (S) ⊆ F (S ).
Definition 21. The grounded extension of a preference symmetric EAF , denoted GE( ), is the least fixed point of its characteristic function F .
If is finitary, then
We now show that the grounded extension of a ps-EAF can be obtained on the basis of 'strict acceptability' (recall the definition of strict defeat S given in Definition 5): ArgsC denote the set of all conflict free subsets of Args. The characteristic function F st of is defined as:
Args .
• F st (S) = {A | A is strictly acceptable w.r.t. S}.
Define for any EAF the following sequence of subsets of Args.
Proposition 13 states that for a ps-EAF, the iteration obtained by the characteristic function F based on the standard definition of acceptability, is the same as the iteration obtained by F st based on strict acceptability. This implies that the grounded extension of a finitary ps-EAF is given by 
Formalising logic programming with defeasible priorities in an extended argumentation framework
Extended argumentation provides an abstract characterisation of preference application while retaining the basic conceptual machinery of Dung. We therefore propose that it provides a semantics for object level non-monotonic formalisms that accommodate defeasible reasoning about preferences (e.g. [14, 24, 34] ). Arguments and attacks defined by these formalisms can instantiate an EAF and the justified arguments under all of Dung's semantics can be evaluated. In this section we show how the inferences obtained in Prakken and Sartor's argument based logic programming with defeasible priorities (ALP-DP) [34] , equate with the claims of justified arguments of a preference symmetric EAF instantiated by arguments and attacks defined by an ALP-DP theory. Furthermore, unlike [34] , one can then determine the justified arguments of an ALP-DP theory under all of Dung's extensional semantics.
Defining arguments on the basis of an ALP-DP theory
In ALP-DP, arguments are chained sequences of named logic program rules. The head of a rule can express a priority ordering on the names of other rules. Hence, given arguments A1 and A2, one can identify 'priority' arguments B1, B2, . . . -S is a set of strict rules of the form s :
and:
• Each rule name r (s) is a first order term.
• Each L i is a strong literal, i.e., an atomic first order formula, or such a formula preceded by strong negation ¬.
• Each ∼ L i is a weak literal, where L i is a strong literal, and ∼ denotes negation as failure, so that ∼ L i is read as "there is no evidence that L i is the case".
As usual, a rule with variables is a scheme standing for all its ground instances. Henceforth, head(r) denotes the consequent L n of the rule named r. Also, for any atom A, we say that A and ¬A are the complement of each other. In the metalanguage, L denotes the complement of a literal L. The language is assumed to contain a two-place predicate symbol ≺ for expressing priorities on rule names. To ensure that ≺ is a strict partial order, the strict rules S are always assumed to contain the following: An argument A is based on the theory (S, D) iff all rules in A are in S ∪ D. In the definitions that follow we assume that arguments are relative to a theory (S, D).
Definition 25-1(a) says that arguments formed by chaining rules can ignore weak literals. Definition 25-1(b) prevents arguments from containing circular chains of reasoning. In [34] , arguments are exclusively defined by 25-1. Preferences between arguments are then parameterised w.r.t. a set T , based on the ordering claimed by the set of singleton priority arguments in T . In this paper, we have additionally defined composite priority arguments in 25-2, so that an ordering, and hence a preference, is claimed by a single argument. This is the only modification we introduce to ALP-DP as defined in [34] . From hereon, to enhance readability we will describe only propositional examples, and as an abuse of notation write arguments as sequences of rule names rather than the rules that the names identify. 
Amongst the arguments that can be constructed are:
Note that B3 is a composite argument concluding the ordering r2 ≺ r1, r4 ≺ r3. Example 9. Let S = {o1, . . . , o4} and D the set of rules:
In [34] the following is defined:
Definition 26. For any arguments A, A and literal L:
• A is strict iff it does not contain any defeasible rule; it is defeasible otherwise.
• A is a sub-argument of A iff A is a subsequence of A.
• L is a conclusion of A iff L is the head of some rule in A.
• L is an assumption of A iff ∼ L occurs in some antecedent of a rule in A.
• If T is a sequence of rules, then A + T is the concatenation of A and T .
• By definition, A = [ ] is an argument of any ALP-DP theory, and is referred to as the empty argument.
Defining attacks and preferences between ALP-DP arguments
In [34] , the authors motivate definition of attacks between arguments that account for the ways in which arguments can be extended with strict rules: Definition 27. A1 attacks A2 iff there are sequences S1 and S2 of strict rules such that A1 + S1 is an argument with conclusion L and 1. A2 + S2 is an argument with a conclusion L, in which case A1 and A2 are said to symmetrically conclusion-conclusion attack on the pair (L, L) ¬(r2 ≺ r1) . Also, A3 and A4 conclusion-conclusion attack on the pairs (a, ¬a) and (b, ¬b). In Example 9, A1 and A3 symmetrically conclusion-conclusion attack on the pair (a, ¬a), and both A2 and A3 undercut A1 on the pair (b, ¬b).
In general, since arguments A and A can attack each other on more than one pair of conclusions, then there may different sequences of strict rules that extend these arguments to account for the pairs of conclusions on which they attack.
Note that arguments can conclusion-conclusion attack or undercut themselves. For example, [r : ∼ a ⇒ a] undercuts itself, and [r1 : ⇒ a, r2 : a ⇒ ¬a] conclusion-conclusion attacks itself.
Notation 2.
A is incoherent iff A conclusion-conclusion attacks or undercuts itself.
In [34] , a preference amongst conclusion-conclusion attacking arguments is based on a comparison of the sets of defeasible rules that contribute to derivation of the conflicting conclusions.
Definition 28.
If A + S is an argument with conclusion L, the defeasible rules R L (A + S) relevant to L are:
We define [34] 's ordering on the above sets, and hence preferences amongst arguments, w.r.t. an ordering concluded by a single composite priority argument (rather than a set of singleton priority arguments as in [34] ): Definition 29. Let C be a priority argument concluding the ordering ≺. Let R and R be sets of defeasible rules. Then R > R iff ∃r ∈ R s.t. ∀r , r ∈ R implies r ≺ r .
Intuitively, R can be made better by replacing some rule in R with any rule in R , while the reverse is impossible. Given a priority ordering ≺ concluded by an argument C , we say that A is preferred ≺ to B if for every pair (L, L ) on which they conclusion-conclusion attack, the set of A's defeasible rules relevant to L is stronger (>) than the set of B's defeasible rules relevant to L . 
Example 11. In Example 8, B3 concludes r2 ≺ r1, r4 ≺ r3, and so R a (A3) > R ¬a (A4), R b (A3) > R ¬b (A4), and A3 is preferred ≺ to A4. In Example 9, B1 concludes r3 ≺ r1, and so R a (A1) > R ¬a (A3) and A1 is preferred ≺ to A3.
Observe that:
1. If A and B are strict arguments that conclusion-conclusion attack (recall that they cannot undercut since strict rules contain no weak literals) then the sets of relevant defeasible rules for the pairs of conclusions on which they attack are obviously empty. Hence, it cannot be the case that A is preferred ≺ to B, or B is preferred ≺ to A, for any ordering ≺. 2. By Definition 29, R > R whenever R is empty and R is non-empty. Hence, if A is strict and B defeasible, and these arguments conclusion-conclusion attack, then for any ordering ≺, A is preferred ≺ to B.
Evaluating the status of ALP-DP arguments in extended argumentation frameworks
Prior to instantiating an EAF with ALP-DP arguments, we review [34] 's definition of the acceptability of arguments and the grounded extension of an ALP-DP theory: Definition 31. Let (S, D) be an ALP-DP theory. [34] defines:
1. Args to be the set of arguments as defined in Definition 25-1.
2. A1 ∈ Args conclusion-conclusion or undercuts attacks A2 ∈ Args as defined in Definition 27. 3. ∀T ⊆ Args, ≺ T = {r ≺ s | r ≺ s is the conclusion of an argument in T }.
A ∈ Args is preferred ≺ T to B ∈ Args as defined in Definition 30, except that ≺ T is defined as above rather than by a single priority argument. 
is finitary, i.e., each argument in Args is attacked by at most a finite number of arguments, then the least fixed point of G (the grounded extension of (S, D)) is obtained by
1.
[34] obviate against the malign impact of incoherent arguments 5 by having them defeated by the empty argument [ ].
We will adopt the same approach when instantiating an EAF. Thus, R will be defined by the set of pairs ( A, B) where A undercuts or conclusion-conclusion attacks B, or where B is incoherent, in which case A = [ ].
2. If A undercut attacks B then A defeats B irrespective of their relative preference. 6 Hence, only conclusion-conclusion attacks will be subject to d-attack by preference arguments. 3. If A does not undercut B, A conclusion-conclusion attacks B, and in addition B undercuts A, then A cannot defeat B (irrespective of the relative preference of A and B). The rationale for undercuts overriding conclusion-conclusion attacks appeals to intuitions arising from the modelling of legal examples. The fact that B undercuts A effectively means that the conclusion-conclusion attack from A to B cannot succeed as a defeat. This is modelled by the d-
, where, as we will show, the empty argument cannot be attacked and therefore defeated by any argument.
Definition 32. The EAF (Args, R, D) for a theory (S, D)
is defined as follows.
1.
Args is the set of arguments given by Definition 25.
Notice that R1 and R2 may not be disjoint. Hence, R excludes (from being subject to d-attack by preference arguments) those conclusion-conclusion attacks ( A, B) in R2 that are also undercut attacks ( A, B) in R1. Also, by Definition 27, the empty argument cannot participate in a conclusion-conclusion or undercut with any argument. This means that R3 is necessarily disjoint from R1 ∪ R2. The following observations are shown to hold in Lemma 11 in Appendix A: Fig. 8. a) shows the EAF for Example 9; b) shows the EAF for Example 8. 
Remark 1. Let
= (Args, R, D) be the EAF for (S, D). Let
Since the instantiated EAF is preference symmetric, its extensions can be obtained on the basis of ps acceptability. Note that the requirement on EAFs that if (C, (A, B)), (C , (B, A)) ∈ D then (C, C ), (C , C ) ∈ R, is satisfied by Definition 32's instantiation of an EAF, given that:
Proposition 14. Let (Args, R, D) be the EAF for a theory (S, D). If (C, (A, B)), (C , (B, A)) ∈ D then C and C conclusion-conclusion attack.
Example 12. For Example 9, we obtain the ps-EAF shown in Fig. 8a ), in which B1 cannot d-attack the attack from A3 to A1 since A3 undercuts A1. The undercut also means that the empty argument d-attacks the conclusion-conclusion attack from A1 to A3. {A2, A3, B1, [ ]} is the single preferred/complete/stable/grounded extension. Fig. 8b) . {C1, B1, B3, B5, A1, A3} is a subset of the single grounded, preferred, complete and stable extension E.
Example 13. For Example 8 we obtain the EAF in
In general we can show that:
Proposition 15. Let be the EAF for the ALP-DP theory (S, D). Then for s ∈ {grounded, complete, stable, preferred}, if A is sceptically, respectively credulously, justified under the s semantics, then all sub-arguments of A are sceptically, respectively credulously, justified under the s semantics.
The definition of ALP-DP acceptability in [34] (given here in Definition 31-6) requires that a reinstating argument strictly defeat, and thus precludes definition of admissible and preferred extensions. To see why, suppose one defined an admissible extension as a conflict free set T whose members are ALP-DP acceptable w.r.t. T . Consider then the theory (S, D) where
. A is not ALP-DP acceptable with respect to {A} since A does not strictly Tdefeat B. Also, B is not ALP-DP acceptable with respect to {B}. Hence neither can be defined to be admissible (or preferred).
Both the instantiated Dung framework ( A B) and the instantiated EAF both return {A} and {B} as admissible and preferred extensions. Suppose ALP-DP-acceptability was weakened to:
A ∈ Args is ALP-DP2 acceptable w.r.t. T ⊆ Args if all arguments that T -defeat A are T -defeated by an argument in T .
Then, if in addition to r1 and r2 the aforementioned theory also contained r3 : ⇒ r1 ≺ r2, A and C = [r3] would be ALP-DP2 acceptable with respect to {A}, but A would not be ALP-DP2 acceptable with respect to {A, C }, i.e., {A, C } would not be admissible. That is, Dung's fundamental lemma would not hold. As already discussed in Section 4.1, one would want that any definition of acceptability ensure satisfaction of the fundamental lemma. Also, the properties of admissible and preferred extensions described in Proposition 4 and all that is implied by this proposition (including Corollary 1) would not hold. By instantiating an EAF, our definition of acceptability provides for a well defined notion of an ALP-DP theory's admissible extensions and the justified status of ALP-DP arguments under the preferred semantics. We obtain the non-hierarchical EAF in Example 3 (see Fig. 4 ). Recall the observation that no two arguments defeat S each other in S = {A, C , B, D}. Hence, if we had defined a conflict free set as one in which no two arguments defeat each other, then {A, C , B, D} would be the single preferred extension. This strikes us as counter-intuitive; that one should simultaneously hold as justified, arguments that claim contradictory preferences. As it is, we have that ∅ is the grounded extension, and {A, C }, {B, D} the preferred extensions, each of which represent the mutually supportive media outlets; we can either adopt a 'sky and sun' perspective on the world, or a 'guardian and bbc' perspective on the world.
We conclude with a result relating the grounded extension of an ALP-DP theory as defined in [34] , to the grounded extension of the theory's EAF. In [34] , the grounded extension of a finitary ALP-DP theory is the least fixed point of the theory's characteristic function (as described in Definition 31-8). However, a finitary ALP-DP theory does not necessarily yield a finitary EAF (recall the definition of a finitary EAF in Definition 12). It may be that in the theory's EAF, an attack between two conclusion-conclusion attacking arguments may be d-attacked by an infinite number of arguments.
Example 15. Let D in (S, D)
be the infinite set of defeasible rules:
The theory's non-finitary EAF is A B, where for
Hence, we will only consider ALP-DP theories that contain a finite set of rules deriving a priority relation.
Definition 33. (S, D) is priority-finitary iff
• {r | r ∈ D, head(r) = r ≺ r } is finite.
• Any argument in Args is attacked by at most a finite number of arguments in Args (where Args and attack are defined in Definitions 25 and 27 respectively).
Proposition 16. If (S, D) is priority-finitary then its EAF = (Args, R, D) is finitary.
Proposition 17 states that the grounded extension of a priority-finitary ALP-DP theory as defined in [34] , is the same, modulo the composite priority arguments, as the grounded extension of the theory's EAF. That is to say, the grounded extension of the theory's EAF differs only in the contained composite priority arguments.
Definition 34. The sets of arguments S and S are said to be equivalent modulo composite priority arguments, iff:
∈ S then A is a composite priority argument constructed from the singleton priority arguments A 1 , . . . , A n , where n > 1, and for i = 1 . . . n, A i ∈ S (and so A i ∈ S given 1).
Proposition 17. Let (S, D) be a priority-finitary ALP-DP theory, and let GE((S, D)) be the grounded extension of (S, D) as defined in Definition 31-8. Let = (Args, R, D) be the theory's EAF and GE( ) the grounded extension of . Then GE( ) and GE((S, D)) are
equivalent modulo the composite priority arguments.
Related work
The formalisms of Prakken and Sartor [34] and Kakas and Moraitis [24] , both construct arguments from logic programming rules, where these rules may express priorities over other rules. Our work can be viewed as a generalisation of these approaches in that we abstract from the underlying logic and the criteria used for determining preferences. Furthermore, these formalisms do not straightforwardly conform to application of Dung's acceptability calculus, whereas our approach allows for such application, through provision of an abstract characterisation of preference application while retaining the basic conceptual machinery of Dung. We have already shown how arguments defined by an ALP-DP theory instantiate a preference symmetric framework, so that unlike [34] , one can define extensions under the admissible and preferred semantics.
In [24] , arguments are built from a partitioned theory (T , P) consisting of logic programming rules with explicit negation, but without negation as failure. P denotes the set of rules with heads that are of the form hp(r, r ) expressing that r has higher priority than r , where r and r name rules in T ∪ P. An argument is a pair (T , P ) such that T ⊆ T , P ⊆ P and (T , P ) derives (by application of modus ponens) some literal L (T ∪ P L) (notice that (T , P ) may derive more than one literal, and so may contain multiple sets of rules chained through modus ponens). Then, (T , P ) symmetrically conflicts with (T , P ) iff T ∪ P L and T ∪ P ¬L (where L and ¬L may be contradictory priorities on rules). It is the attack relation that accounts for the priorities over rules, so that (T , P ) attacks (T , P ) iff they conflict on some L and ¬L, and such that the minimal subset T 1 ∪ P 1 of T ∪ P used to derive L is preferred to (in the sense of being 'at least as strong as') the minimal subset T 2 ∪ P 2 of T ∪ P used to derive ¬L. We refer the reader to [24] for how such a preference is defined; suffice it to say that the preference for (T 1 , P 1 ) over (T 2 , P 2 ) is based on the (T , P ) derived relative priorities of rules in (T 1 , P 1 ) and (T 2 , P 2 ). Let us here isolate the 'preference argument' (T p , P p ) (T p ⊆ T , P p ⊆ P ) that minimally derives these priorities.
[24] defines the admissibility of an argument (T , P ):
(T , P ) is admissible iff it is conflict free, and for any (T , P ) that attacks (T , P ), (T , P ) attacks (T , P ).
This definition equates with our definition of admissibility. Informally, one can see how to instantiate a preference symmetric EAF: by enumerating all (T , P) defined arguments that are only comprised of single sets of chained rules (as in [34] ); identifying preference arguments; defining R in terms of [24] 's symmetric conflict relation, and; defining D attacks from preference arguments to R attacks, corresponding to [24] 's definition of attack. Then, one can see that (T , P ) is admissible in [24] iff S = {(
Notice, that acceptability of a single argument with respect to set of arguments (and so articulation of a Dung style acceptability calculus and characteristic function) is not defined in [24] . Acceptability would need to be derived from the definition of admissibility, i.e., (T , P ) is acceptable w.r.t. (T , P ) if (T ∪ T , P ∪ P ) is admissible. This imposes stronger requirements than our definitions of acceptability and ps acceptability, neither of which would require showing that all arguments in (T ∪ T , P ∪ P ) are acceptable w.r.t. (T ∪ T , P ∪ P ) (as highlighted at the end of Section 4.1).
Other non-monotonic formalisms that enable reasoning about preferences, but that do not employ concepts from argumentation theory, include [14] and [17] . For example, [17] make use of a preference operator ⊗, so that a defeasible rule such as ¬sun_shining ⇒ raining ⊗ snowing expresses that if it is believed that the sun is not shining, then it is believed that it is raining; but if it is not raining then it is believed that is snowing. Given that the sun is not shining, one can see how the defeasible rule could be used in the construction of an argument A1 claiming that it is raining, and a symmetrically attacking argument A2 claiming that it is snowing, and an argument expressing a default preference for A1 over A2. If it turns out to be the case that it is not raining, this would constitute an argument defeating A1, so that A2 would now be reinstated.
We conclude by mentioning the work of [10] , in which argument frameworks are similarly extended to allow attacks on attacks. In this way, the strength of one argument's attack on another can be modified by another argument. The authors then describe how the strengths of arguments can propagate through the framework. However, this work does not address the issue of how to define the status of arguments under Dung's semantics.
Conclusions
This paper has extended Dung's theory of argumentation to integrate metalevel argumentation about preferences. Dung's level of abstraction is preserved, so that arguments expressing preferences are distinguished by being the source of a second attack relation that abstractly characterises application of preferences by attacking attacks between the arguments that are the subject of the preference claims. Dung's acceptability calculus has been extended to additionally account for reinstatement of attacks, and extensional semantics are then (apart from the grounded semantics) defined in exactly the same way as for a Dung framework. The extended theory thus retains the basic conceptual machinery of Dung's theory, and some basic results that hold for a Dung framework are also shown to hold for the extended framework. We therefore propose that applications and developments of Dung's theory can be readily modified to accommodate argumentation about preferences. In particular, proof theories [30] to determine the justified status of an argument A, take the form of games played between the proponent and opponent of A. Each player responds to its counterpart's move (argument) with an argument that attacks its counterpart's argument, and rules on the legality of moves vary according to the semantics under which the justified status of A is to be established. Ongoing work is focusing on adapting these proof theories to EAFs, by additionally allowing players to move arguments against the attacks that are implicitly moved by their counterparts.
Future work will also focus on development of dialogue frameworks in which participants can argue about preferences. Dung's inherently dialectical theory, and subsequent development of argument games, has informed development of dialogue frameworks in which participants' locutions implicitly define arguments that can be organised into a Dung framework. For example, Prakken defines a general framework for conflict resolution dialogues [33] that we believe can readily be generalised to accommodate preference arguments that can then be organised into an EAF. In a recent general framework for negotiation dialogues [4] , an agent can decide to accept or reject offers based on its own argumentation based model of reasoning about offers. The model assumes a given preference ordering on arguments. However, a comprehensive account of negotiation will also require that agents can justify and debate their preferences. Work on deliberation dialogues [21] , in which agents collaboratively decide on a preferred course of action, have also highlighted the need to debate the preferences that each agent uses when proposing or rejecting a course of action.
Our work provides a formal setting for studying application of preferences, and more generally, removal of attacks. We have shown that a less involved definition of acceptability suffices for preference symmetric EAFs, and that while in general an EAF's characteristic function is not monotonic, the characteristic functions of hierarchical and preference symmetric EAFs do satisfy monotonicity. Our work on preference symmetric EAFs can also inform work on resolution based semantics [9, 26] , whereby a framework's resolutions obtained by substituting asymmetric for symmetric attacks; indeed, the choice of resolution can now be explicitly modelled through integration of preference arguments.
The extended theory is proposed as a unifying formalism for works that augment Dung's abstract theory with preferences, and as a framework for instantiation by non-monotonic logics whose object level languages allow for expression of priorities over rules. In Section 5 we described how value based argumentation [11] , extended to allow integration of metalevel reasoning about values and value orderings, can be formalised in hierarchical EAFs. In Section 7, the inferences of an ALP-DP theory [34] were shown to correspond with the claims of arguments in the grounded extension of an EAF instantiated by the theory's arguments and attacks. In contrast with [34] , we also provided a well defined notion of the admissible and preferred extensions of an ALP-DP theory. It remains to formally show that extended argumentation semantics can be given for other object level formalisms such as [14, 17, 24] .
In Section 5 we described a practical reasoning example that assumed arguments constructed in an underlying BDI logic as described in [8] . This work is one amongst a number of recent works (e.g., [24, 25, 35] ) that propose argumentation based approaches to agent reasoning over the whole gamut of mental attitudes, including beliefs, goals, intentions, etc. We suggest that the framework described in this paper will facilitate development of agent reasoning formalisms that provide for defeasible reasoning about preferences, and thus provide for agent flexibility and adaptability (this proposal is explored in more detail in [29, 31] and also by Kakas and Moraitis [23, 24] ). For example, the BOID agent architecture characterises generated candidate goal sets as extensions of a prioritised default logic theory in which rules for inferring goals are modelled as defaults, and a prioritisation of these defaults resolves conflicts between goals [22] . Agent behavioural types correspond to different prioritisations. For example, a 'social' agent uniformly prioritises defaults for obligation derived goals above defaults for desire derived goals. However, certain contexts may warrant selfish behaviour (corresponding to the reverse prioritisation). Such behavioural heterogeneity requires reasoning as to which prioritisation (agent type) is appropriate in a given context. In [29] , we suggest that extended argumentation frameworks will facilitate development of logical formalisms for contextual reasoning of this type.
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Appendix A
A.1. Proofs of propositions in Section 3
Proposition 1. If A defeats S B then ∀S ⊆ S, A defeats S B.
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from Definition 5. 2
Proposition 2. Let S be conflict free subset of Args in (Args, R, D). Then for any X, Y ∈ S, X does not defeat S Y .
Proof. Suppose X, Y ∈ S, X → S Y . In which case ( X, Y ) ∈ R and ¬∃Z ∈ S s.t. (Z , (X, Y )) ∈ D, contradicting S is conflict free. 2
A.2. Proofs of propositions in Section 4
Lemma 1 is required for the proof of Proposition 3. The following lemma and proof of Proposition 3 refer to an EAFs characteristic function defined in Definition 10.
Lemma 1. Let S be a conflict free subset of Args in (Args, R, D), and let A be an argument that is acceptable w.r.t. S. Then:
A does not defeat S A.
∀C ∈ S, C does not defeat S A.
Proof. (1) Suppose
A → S A. By assumption of A acceptable w.r.t. S, ∃D ∈ S s.t. D → S A, ∃E ∈ S s.t. E → S D,
Lemma 2. Let S and S be subsets of Args in (Args, R, D). If S ⊆ S and no argument in S defeats S an argument in S − S. Then F (S) ⊆ F (S ).
Proof. Let A ∈ F (S). Suppose 
A is acceptable w.r.t. S .
Proof. 1) By assumption of A acceptable w.r.t S and Lemma 1-2, no argument in S defeats S an argument in S − S (= {A}). Hence, by Lemma 2, F (S) ⊆ F (S ). Since S is admissible and A is acceptable w.r.t. S, then S ∪ {A} ⊆ F (S), and so S ⊆ F (S ),
i.e., S is admissible. 
2) Follows from F (S) ⊆ F (S )
and
The set of all admissible extensions of form a complete partial order w.r.t. set inclusion.
For each admissible extension E of there exists a preferred extension E of such that E ⊆ E .
Proof. Immediately from Proposition 3 and definition of preferred extensions (Definition 9). 2
Corollary 1. Every EAF possesses at least one preferred extension.
Proof. From Proposition 4 and the fact that ∅ is an admissible extension of any EAF. 2
Proposition 5. Every stable extension of an EAF is a preferred extension but not vice versa.
Proof. It is clear that each stable extension is a preferred extension. To show the reverse does not hold, one need only consider an EAF containing a single argument that attacks itself. ∅ is the single preferred extension. There is no stable extension. 2
We establish some lemmas required for the proofs of the propositions that follow. 
Lemma 5. Let S be a conflict free subset of Args in (Args, R, D). Suppose S ⊆ F (S). Then F (S) is conflict free.
Proof. Assume F (S) is not conflict free. Then ∃A, B ∈ F (S) such that either If (B, A) ∈ R, then by Definition 5, it must be that B → ∅ A and so A cannot be acceptable w.r.t. ∅. 
Proposition 6. Let F be the characteristic function of an EAF, and F
Proof. Follows as a special case of Lemma 6, where
A.3. Proofs of propositions in Section 5
Proposition 7. Let F be the characteristic function of a bounded hierarchical EAF = (Args, R, D). Let S and S be conflict free subsets of Args such that S ⊆ S . Then F (S) ⊆ F (S ).
Proof. Assume A is acceptable w.r.t. S. We show that A is acceptable w.r.t. S . Since S ⊆ S , C 1 ∈ S , and so to show A is acceptable w.r.t. S , it is sufficient to show there is a reinstatement set R S for
Since is hierarchical, we can identify a sequenced partition of the reinstatement set R S for C 1 → S B1. Let H = (( (Args 1 , R 1 ), D 1 ) , . . . , ((Args n , R n ), D n )) be the partition of . Since is bounded (D n = ∅) one can represent R S by the finite:
where:
1) for each defeat in R S j , j < k, any defence attack on the defeat originates from an argument that is itself defeated
Proof is by induction on the above sequenced partition:
Inductive hypothesis:
General case:
. Since R S is a reinstatement set, ∃C ∈ S, C ∈ Args j+1 , C → S B ∈ R S j+1 . By inductive hypothesis, C → S B . But then since C , B ∈ S and S is conflict free by assumption, this contradicts Proposition 2. 2 Lemma 7 states that the characteristic function of a finitary EAF is ω-continuous. This is required for the proof of Proposition 8.
Lemma 7. Let F be the characteristic function of a finitary EAF = (Args, R, D). Then F is ω-continuous.
Proof. Let S 0 ⊆ · · · ⊆ S n ⊆ · · · be an increasing sequence of sets of arguments, and let
Since there are finitely many arguments B that attack and so defeat S A, and for any such B → S A, there are finitely many arguments C s.t. (C, (B, A) (Args, R, D) be a bounded hierarchical EAF. Then:
If is finitary, then
Proof.
1.
Immediately from the monotonicity of F for bounded hierarchical EAFs (Proposition 7). 
By definition (for both Dung and extended frameworks), a complete extension is a fixed point of a framework's characteristic function, and the grounded and preferred extensions are, respectively, the least and maximal (under set inclusion) complete extensions. Hence, let F Γ and F be the characteristic functions of (Args, R a ) and respectively. The proposition is proved by showing: S is a fixed point of F Γ iff S is a fixed point of F , where S ⊆ S and (S − S) ∩ Args = ∅, which holds iff:
∀Z ∈ Args, Z is acceptable w.r.t. S iff Z is acceptable w.r.t. S .
(i)
Prior to proving (i), note that since a ∈ Args is not attacked by any argument, then:
(ii) (i) is shown by showing 1) and 2) below:
There are two cases to consider: 
A.4. Proofs of propositions in Section 6
Lemma 8 is used in the proof of Proposition 10. Proof. 
. . .
(1)
such that:
-for some n 2, {C n 1 . . . C n m } is the set of all arguments in S that defeat S B n (2)
) Intuitively, given a preference argument B n attacking an attack that originates from an argument in S, then for the set {C n 1 → S B n . . . C n m → S B n } of all potential reinstating defeats, each such defeat must itself be challenged and not defeat reinstated (this is visualised in Fig. 9 ). Note that it must be that n 2 since C 1 → S B1 is reinstated, and so there must at least be a set {C 2 1 . . . C 2 m }. Note also that since for j = 1 . . . m, C n j → S B n is challenged by a preference argument, then since is preference symmetric, we have that for j =
Proof is by contradiction. Suppose no reinstatement set R S for C 1 → S B1, and so there exists a set of sequences as described in (1) Proof. The proof proceeds in the same way as for the left to right half of Proposition 10, except that A ∈ Args (rather than restricting to A ∈ S) and in i) and ii) the assumption of arguments in S being ps acceptable w.r.t. S is replaced by the assumption of arguments in S being acceptable w.r.t. S. 2
Proposition 11. Let F be the characteristic function of a preference symmetric EAF(Args, R, D). Let S and S be conflict free subsets of Args such that S ⊆ S . Then F (S) ⊆ F (S ).
Proof. Given Lemma 2 it suffices to show that no A ∈ S defeats S some B ∈ S − S. 
If is finitary, then
1. Immediately from the monotonicity of F for preference symmetric EAFs (Proposition 11).
From Lemma 7. 2
Lemmas 9 and 10 are used in the proof of Proposition 13. 
Proof. Proof follows from Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, where:
i ' in the statement of Lemma 10.
• In the proof of Lemma 10: i) Lemma 6 substitutes for Proposition 6; ii) in proof of the base case, F (C, (A, B) ), (C , (B, A) ) ∈ D then C and C conclusion-conclusion attack.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 17 below makes use of the following lemmas and notation. In what follows we will refer to [34] 's definition of arguments, attack, defeat, acceptability and an ALP-DP theory's characteristic function, as they are defined here in Definition 31. Notation 3. S is said to be closed under priority arguments if A 1 + · · · + A n is a composite priority argument in S iff {A 1 , . . . , A n } ⊆ S, where for i = 1 . . . n, A i is a singleton priority argument.
Lemma 14. Given an ALP-DP theory (S, D), let Args and Args PS97
Proof. Left to right half : Suppose C ∈ S concludes ≺, where C = C 1 + · · · + C n . Since S and S PS97 are emcpa, then there is a •
-If A undercuts B, then A S PS97 -defeats B (Definition 31-4(b)), and A defeats S B (Lemma 11-2).
-If A does not undercut B, A conclusion-conclusion attacks B and B does not undercut A, then:
A defeats S B iff there is no C ∈ S such that C concludes ≺ and B is preferred ≺ to A (Definition 32-3(a)). -Suppose B undercuts C . Then B defeats S C by Lemma 11-2. By assumption of C ∈ S being strict-acceptable w.r.t. S, there is a C ∈ S s.t. C strictly defeats S B.
-Suppose B does not undercut C (and so B i does not undercut C ), and:
• C undercuts B i , and so C undercuts B. By Lemma 11-2, C defeats S B. If C and B do not conclusion-conclusion attack then C strictly defeats S B. Suppose C and B conclusion-conclusion attack. Since C undercuts B, then by Lemma 11-6, B cannot defeat S C , and so C strictly defeats S B.
• C does not undercut B i , C conclusion-conclusion attacks B i , and so C conclusion-conclusion attacks B. Hence, (C, B) , (B, C ) ∈ R, S is conflict free, and so by Lemma 3, either C → S B or B → S C .
Suppose B S C . Then C strictly defeats S B.
Suppose B → S C . Then by assumption of C being strict acceptable w.r. 
Base case: Since [ ] ∈ F 1 , then given a) and b), (F
Inductive hypothesis: (1) holds for j < i. In the following Lemmas 20 and 21 we refer to [34] 's definitions of an ALP-DP theory's arguments Args, the attack relation on Args, conflict free subsets of Args, T -defeat, ALP-DP-acceptability, an ALP-DP theory's characteristic function G, and its grounded extension (all of which are defined in this paper in Definition 31). D) ) the grounded extension of (S, D) as defined as defined in [34] a) the arguments B that are not undercut or conclusion-conclusion attacked by any argument, i.e., {B | ∀A ∈ Args, (A, B) / ∈ R}, and; b) the arguments B that are not undercut by any argument, and for any A that conclusion-conclusion attacks B ((A, B) ∈ R), B undercuts A (and so ([ ], (A, B) ) ∈ D) . • [ ] ∈ F * 
